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Abstract 
After a decade as Prime Minister of Australia, John Howard has attained a 
substantial place in the nation's political history. His success can be 
measured in numerous ways: four successive victories for his Liberal-
National Party Coalition in general elections since 1996, five opponents in 
turn at the head of the rival Australian Labor Party and consistently high 
approval ratings in opinion polls for his performance as prime minister. He 
has also dominated the political discourse of Australia. His views and 
policy positions have become progressively entrenched. This is especially 
true in the areas of international affairs, military engagement and patriotic 
causes. John Howard's philosophy and ideas provide the substantial fuel 
for his dominance but two other factors have produced high-octane 
achievement: his Government's reaction to the tide of world events and a 
political acumen demonstrated in effectively communicating to the 
electorate at large. 
The Howard Government's ability to harness the power of mass media 
images (derived from 'set piece' photographs and associated TV footage of 
the PM) is the focus of this research. Drawing upon evidence from the 
fields of public relations, journalism, photography and political practice, 
this dissertation explains the immense contribution of visual 
communications to the Prime Minister's success. 
The research has been able to demonstrate that Prime Minister Howard's 
visual portrayal is thoroughly constructed by the political PR machine 
supporting his party and Government. It also highlights how the role of 
pictures in sending political messages is consistent with contemporary 
political communications practice. At the same time, picture management 
of such style and scale exploits the modus operandi of journalists based in 
Canberra and has proved to be a powerful contributing factor in Howard's 
enduring electoral dominance and polling status as preferred head of 
government. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the pages of Australian political chronicles, John Howard has earned a 
formidable and impressive reputation, even while he remains in power and 
seemingly ascendant. His is both an unlikely story - in terms of its long 
and often less than overwhelming gestation - and a brilliant story - in 
terms of its unashamed exploitation of the times. Howard the humbled, 
weighed down by a shortfall of success in the first two decades of his long 
parliamentary career, ended up as Howard the hero, a cunning and 
disciplined leader who mastered an explosion in the mass media's appetite 
and reach to bask in a new image and stunning electoral victories. 
The story of Howard's ultimate success in office constitutes a compelling 
chapter in Australian politics. It speaks volumes for tenacity, for learning 
from others, for the skills needed to elevate the plain to the status of the 
preferred and for the power of the camera lens to create and sustain 
political communications. 
Background 
Although Howard was deputy leader and had held the senior post of 
Treasurer in the Fraser Government defeated in 1983, his party overlooked 
him in favour of Andrew Peacock to replace Fraser who resigned from 
Parliament. He did eventually become Opposition Leader but then lost the 
1987 election and was subsequently dumped by his party in 1989. "In the 
mid-198os, you couldn't give him away," says Morris (2006). The Liberals 
re-instated Peacock who lost in 1990 at the polls. They then turned to John 
Hewson, but failed to win the 1993 election and in 1994 Hewson's 
leadership imploded. According to Bongiorno (interview with author, 
2006), despite the fact that Howard and some supporters lobbied furiously 
in the party room, Howard gained few votes "because people thought he 
was unelectable. He'd been to the people and been beaten in the polls." 
The party instead experimented disastrously with youth, installing 
Alexander Downer in the top job. As Bongiorno (interview with author, 
2006) explains, "when Downer imploded, out of sheer desperation, they 
returned to Howard". The Liberal Party's polling, according to Morris 
(2006), indicated that voters "thought of Howard as 'Uncle John' and liked 
his values". At the 1996 poll, Morris (ibid) points out, "Australians decided 
they preferred him to what they saw as an arrogant, out-of-touch Paul 
Keating". In the decade that followed, as his stature grew, he went on to 
win another three general elections, delivering in an abundance no-one 
imagined possible. 
Objectives 
The objectives of this research project were to demonstrate whether Prime 
Minister Howard's visual portrayal is: 
• carefully engineered by the political PR machine supporting his 
party and Government, 
• aided by the Australian media's national reporting structures and 
modus operandi, 
• consistent with contemporary political communications practice, 
and 
• a powerful contributing factor in his enduring electoral dominance 
and polling status as preferred head of government. 
Structure 
This dissertation comprises four main chapters which are structured 
around the pillars of the hypothesis I set out to examine: 
• Tacticians: The work of the public relations tacticians and the 
strategies they pursue. This chapter discusses the principles and 
practices of contemporary political public relations within the 
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framework of the Howard Government's years in office as well as 
the application of semiotics; 
o Talent: An analysis of the Prime Minister himself as the key 'talent' 
to be marketed by his party and government. It also discusses the 
evolution of his image; 
o Transmitters: A chapter on what I have called the prime 
transmitters of political information in Australia the 
Parliamentary Press Gallery domiciled in Canberra - and its 
operational imperatives. Particular attention is given to the media's 
access to the Prime Minister and its outcomes; 
• Targets: A final chapter exploring how the targets of political 
messages, the Australian electorate at large, have been able to relate 
to, access and respond to the Howard prime ministership and the 
public image it has projected. 
Methodology 
A review of literature at the commencement of the study provided a 
breadth of understanding of the elements that combine to deliver Howard's 
supremacy. From this examination it was possible to identify a theoretical 
basis for the skilful application of public relations insights and practices by 
the Government and the Liberal Party. These have helped to characterise 
the nature and strength of Howard's national leadership. It was also 
possible to apply the study of semiotics to the way Howard is projected 
pictorially as a political figure. Literature pertaining to the culture and 
mechanics of contemporary political reporting, especially in the visually-
powerful media of press and television, with its concentration in Canberra, 
was also researched. 
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Scrutiny of the literature continued over the full period of the research, 
revealing a range of inter-related threads pertinent to and generally 
supporting the central hypothesis that prime ministerial photo 
opportunities are carefully constructed and, as a result, laden with signs 
that are imbued with political messages. 
I set out to examine the strategic construction of the PM's photos and the 
semiotics of their contents. Many of these I tested with participants in the 
process. 
Comprehensive face-to-face interviews were conducted in Canberra with 
players representing three key sections of the political-media-public 
relations spectrum: a senior television journalist, head of a network 
bureau; a veteran press reporter, servicing the entire News Ltd chain; and 
the man ~redited with setting the direction for much of the Prime 
Minister's communications strategies, his inaugural chief-of-staff. The 
subjects of the lengthy interviews were: 
• Paul Bongiorno, a former print journalist with the Courier Mail 
newspaper in Brisbane, is Network Ten's Parliament House Bureau 
Chief and Political Editor. Bongiorno is the current Vice-President 
of the Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery. He has also hosted the 
weekly political interview program Meet The Press since March 1996. 
• Glenn Milne, a former chief political correspondent for the Seven 
Network, is now senior Canberra correspondent for the Sunday 
Telegraph and a range of other Sunday papers in the News Limited 
stable. He also writes a weekly column for The Australian. 
• Grahame Morris, a one-time journalist from country NSW, was 
Prime Minister Howard's first chief-of-staff in 1996. In this role he 
served as a key advisor on communications strategy. He later 
worked as the principal of a major public relations and lobbying 
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company, Jackson Wells Morris, and is now Chairman of the Office 
of Federal Government Services, Pricewaterhouse Coopers. He 
remains a close friend of Howard. 
In order to try to achieve a spread of backgrounds, gender and age among 
respondents, I canvassed more than 20 prospective interview subjects for 
this project, including six women prominent in the political media, but 
none of the latter was able to be engaged. 
Throughout the thesis I have sought to present an analysis of the semiotics 
of photographs that are recognisable products of the political apparatus 
devoted to projecting the Howard imagery. 
In my research and writing, I have been able to draw upon my own 
extensive experience and expertise in the fields of journalism and public 
relations, in which I have worked for 35 years. In the dissertation I have 
applied my own knowledge derived from the principles and practices of 
these professions and from a 40-year informal study of Australian politics. 
Limitations 
The literature from the various fields pertaining to this topic suggested 
there was considerable scope to examine the phenomenon of photographic 
opportunities among political leaders in general, given that the use of 
highly-constructed picture facilities (abbreviated, in the jargon of the 
media, as pic facs) appears to be widespread both in Australia and globally. 
Indeed some of the interview respondents traced the origins of this work to 
previous Australian politicians. The deployment of these communications 
tactics by leaders such as President George W. Bush in the US and Prime 
Minister Tony Blair in Britain offered fertile ground for examination but I 
decided to omit such a study simply due to the limited size of this thesis. 
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I also decided to restrict the chosen examples of Prime Minister Howard's 
visual depiction to still photographs sourced from the public record - press 
pictures and, in a few instances, pictures from the Prime Minister's own 
web site. There are several reasons for this: 
1. The relative ease of reproducing the photographs in this 
dissertation; 
2. The fact that most if not all the images were paralleled in television 
footage because, by the nature of the picture opportunities, TV 
cameras invariably had the same or similar access to the talent; and 
3. The power of photographs to make a significant impact on the 
minds of readers. 
This final argument finds testimony in Ricketson's observation (2006): 
"Where words are black marks on a page that must be processed 
intellectually before they have any meaning, pictures prompt a more 
visceral response, and unlike television, they don't go away." 
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CHAPTER 1 
TACTICIANS 
Applied to politics, the essential purpose of public relations is to promote 
and protect the image, ideas and views of political players. The Federal 
Government employs a vast number of public relations practitioners 
(Grattan, 1998, p. 35) who are euphemistically called media advisers and 
operate effectively as gatekeepers. The trend has prompted some political 
scientists to consider Australia to be aPR state (Ward & Stewart, 2006, p. 
199). Young (2004, p. 77) cites estimates that there are now 4,000 
journalists working in public relations for state and federal governments. 
This chapter delves into one major facet of public relations in politics, 
focusing on the careful and strategic management of the leader's photo 
opportunities or pic facs (picture facilities) by Prime Minister Howard and 
his circle of advisers. According to the key participants interviewed in the 
course of this research, the office has been able to consistently engineer 
powerful visual images that shape perceptions of the PM's capacity and 
performance. Throughout this dissertation there are examples presented of 
pictures sourced from media outlets. Others come from a prime ministerial 
web site which maintains a section called photo gallery. 
The approach of the media advisers in the leader's inner sanctum is 
soundly underpinned by a body of experience and research that establishes 
the virtues of paying acute attention to the way pictures convey meaning 
and influence opinions. Morris describes the media minders as good 
operators, confirming that they stage-manage the pic facs (interview with 
author, 2006). Craig (2004, p. 116) asserts that "contemporary politics is 
substantially centred around the production of media images and public 
judgements about those images." Petley (2000, p. 47) identifies the 
everyday influence of media in conveying knowledge to the masses from 
which attitudes are formed. In analysing how voters form their views, 
Bongiorno (interview with author, 2006) says "the intersection of issues 
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and politics is obviously the mass media". According to O'Neill (1993, p. 
119), public relations practitioners working in politics have a capacity "to 
create news events to order", manipulating the detail of politicians' media 
appearances down to "every visual prop". He concludes: "Control the 
pictures and you control the story." Former Chief of Staff and long-time 
political strategist to John Howard, Grahame Morris (interview with 
author, 2006), puts it simply: "Image is everything." Hence the best PR can 
end up looking like news (Stauber and Rampton, 2004, p. 14), an outcome 
Bongiorno says is easy to achieve for the government of the day (interview 
with author, 2006). This result is the product of the highly professional 
selling of political messages through maximum management and 
manipulation ofthe media (Grattan, 1998, p. 34). 
Public relations practitioners have perfected the methods and motives for 
manipulating the content of visual images in order to impart particular 
messages and meaning. Kelly (1995, p. 199) refers to the staging of events 
to maximise visual appeal: "Image merchants put the correct 'spin' on 
[politicians'] performances"(p.263). Kelly cites the view of a British 
pollster, Robert Worcester, that the things people see stick in their minds. 
The political insiders interviewed for this research conclude that the 
response of people looking at a press picture or TV image can be managed 
through careful attention to what elements are included in pic facs. "This is 
true," says Bongiorno (interview with author, 2006), "therefore a lot of care 
is often given to where picture opportunities will be." 
According to Morris (interview with author, 2006), Prime Minister Howard 
uses appropriate backgrounds for his pic facs.: 
The PM's office has an advance party whose brief is to consider 
locations and backdrops for use when the leader is to speak. This is 
done to try to control the image. You want as few distractions as 
possible to the message itself. 
Each interview subject cites examples of objects included in Howard's 
regular photo opportunities and explains their significance in 
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communicating meaning to the reader or viewer. These are discussed 
throughout this dissertation. 
An important conclusion to be drawn from this research is that the power 
of visual images to deliver political success does not need to be proved in 
some empirical fashion. A widely-held perception that such power exists is 
sufficient for it to be pursued by those shaping political communications. 
As Morris (interview with author, 2006) observes, Prime Ministers used to 
have a single press secretary but now there are whole PR machines 
deployed. That effort would not happen if it did not yield results. 
Consider how this phenomenon works. 
Among the key tasks of the PR operatives is determining and 'cleansing' the 
locations and settings for TV shots and press pictures. For instance, 
distracting backgrounds are to be avoided. An example of such a 
background is a crowd in which there is any hint of chaos or discord. Other 
examples are discussed further on. Morris (interview with author, 2006) 
observes: "Much effort goes into eliminating any elements that could prove 
distractions." He adds: 
There was a time when camera operators and photographers could go 
behind the leader, say at an election policy launch, to take shots over the 
speaker's shoulder so the leader's back was depicted with the audience 
in view. This can be quite disruptive and a major distraction. Today the 
preferred setting requires natural breaks behind the leaders to prevent 
any pictures that prevent the message getting full attention. There are 
now small armies deployed doing this work. 
Howard's people "have become masters of set dressing" (Bongiorno, 
interview with author, 2006). 
One of the most illuminating and sustained examples of the construction of 
visual settings is the strategic use of the area of Parliament House known as 
the Prime Minister's courtyard. This has become the preferred location for 
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the PM's press conferences, a practice that started with Paul Keating and 
has been vigorously enhanced by Howard. 
Figure1 
PM courtya1·d: Press conference location designed to send the most favourable signs. 
(Source: l'l·ime Minister's web site- www.pm.gou.aujnewsjphoto_ galleryjimg_ leadersjo20309DI-o3}Pg) 
As figure 1 shows, the leader is flanked by flags at a rostrum with what is 
called a splitter box so there is not a sea of microphones around him 
(Bongiorno, interview with author, 2006). The PM walks out of his office 
and stands at the podium. He looks important, presidential and in charge. 
Imp01tantly, the door is right behind him: 
He can terminate the press conference, turn on his heel and walk 
away- and it never looks bad. If you do it down in the blue room in 
Parliament House, he's up on a podium and if he's under pressure 
there is a 10-second pan with the TV cameras as he dodges the 
questions. So those are considerations as well. Whereas going back 
through the [courtyard] door, you're going back into your office, just 
resuming work. You can't get a picture of him running away down in 
that courtyard or being bombarded with questions as he leaves. A 
leader's awkward exit when they're panic-stricken or under pressure 
can easily become the story. (Milne, interview with author, 2006) 
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All these factors are thoroughly thought through. The tacticians in the PM's 
office utterly control his pic facs (Bongiorno, interview with author, 2006) 
and in so doing anticipate anything that might put at risk the key messages 
espoused by a head of government who always wants to be seen as being on 
top of his job and advancing the national interest. 
There is a strong basis for connecting an understanding of the strength of 
visual impressions with consideration of how photographs and TV images 
can be constructed. The field of semiotics is instructive in this respect. In a 
sample of the literature on this topic, Rayner, Wall and Kruger (2004, p. 
15) describe Roland Barthes' concept of connotation and the interaction 
that occurs when a sign - which for the purpose of this thesis would be the 
characterisation of a photograph of the Prime Minister in action - meets the 
feelings or emotions of the user and the values of their culture. Because we 
are inundated with images today, we instinctively draw conclusions from 
what we see in them. 
Fiske (1982, p. 91) throws further light on the work of Barthes and his 
theory of two orders of signification. This semiotic theory explains that a 
sign denotes an external reality (signifier) and an interpretation (signified). 
As Stevenson (1995, p. 41) explains, Barthes first level of signification, 
called denotation, "refers to the commonsense level of meaning". The 
second level, labelled connotation, "means the implied wider meanings that 
are dependent on certain cultural associations". As a result of different 
cultural codes, then, connotations add meanings to the denoted subject. 
Attention will be drawn to these connotations in many of the selected 
prime ministerial pictures throughout this dissertation. 
Stevenson (1995) also discusses the work of Hall whom he says "makes a 
basic distinction between encoders and decoders". He adds: 
The encoding of the media text is dependent upon certain 
professional norms and procedures, institutional relations and 
technical equipment. Once the message has been symbolically 
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encoded, it is open to the reading strategies employed by the 
audience. The reception of the audience is dependent upon cultural 
and political dispositions, their relationship to wider frameworks of 
power and access to mass-produced technology. (p-42.) 
To determine the extent to which public relations strategists in the political 
arena are conscious adherents to encoding is beyond the scope of this 
research but it is evident from the conceptual origin of most of the PM's 
photographs featured herein that their embedded meanings are neither 
accidental nor incidental. 
The media advisers in offices such as the Prime Minister's exploit what 
Geraghty (cited in Curran and Gurevitch, 2005) calls "the process of 
recognition and understanding". She explains: 
We relate what we see in a photograph, the visual signs, to a wider 
set of understandings. Some of these may be signified directly from 
what is in the photograph; others depend on cultural knowledge 
which can be activated by the photograph. (p. 48) 
The quest to shape political perceptions derives from the extent to which 
leaders such as Howard and their tacticians can influence both the 
denotation and connotation. Put simply, the literature supports a 
conclusion that in the field of political communications, viewer responses 
can be managed to some degree through careful attention to what elements 
are included in picture opportunities. However this management does not 
guarantee uniform responses because visual images, as Barthes recognises 
(cited in de Zepetnek, p. 1), are polysemic, "that is, open to a range of 
possible meanings". This range can be reduced by the use of 'anchorage', 
Barthes' word for text accompanying an image, such as a caption. Using 
figure 1 as an example, some readers will merely see the PM in the 
company of the assembled defence heads; others will see the picture as a 
statement of authority, conveying an almost a 'commander-in-chief 
message. 
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O'Shaugnessy (1999, p. 67) spells out how objects, clothes, colours, camera 
angles, body language and so on all convey connotations. He adds: 
"Another way of describing this mode of analysis is symbolism ... [which] 
tends to suggest something consciously intended by the image maker." The 
symbolism of figure 1 centres on the head of government in total control, 
'ruling' over the country and the military. Public relations practitioners 
readily know how to exploit symbolism. An example would be when a 
politician dons a hard hat to tour a construction site, the hat becomes a 
symbol or sign meaning the political figure is 'on the job, working 
diligently'. Also the politician is aligning 'himself with the 'workers', saying 
he's 'one of us'. Further more, he is proving he follows the rules of the 
workplace. In the next chapter, several examples of this approach involving 
John Howard are discussed. 
Selby and Cowdery (1995, pp. 41-42) look at how to 'read' media texts, 
based on the simple fact that these texts are structured and organised in 
certain ways. Again one such form of analysis is based on semiotics, which 
extracts meaning from the "use of visual codes and conventions". The 
authors readily apply semiotic theory to the analysis of television and the 
use of symbolic props therein. Their impact or interpretation varies within 
the viewing audience. Ang (1996, p. 42) sees audiences as "active" in that 
they negotiate multiple meanings within texts, "articulated within and by a 
complex set of social, political, economic and cultural forces". 
My research shows what this application reveals in the case of a range of 
Prime Minister Howard's 'set piece' television appearances and parallel 
press coverage in that it is possible to identify a string of props apparently 
designed to support and amplify the PM's 'messages dujour'. Using figures 
2,3, 4, and 5 (below), it is instructive to identify some of the visual codes 
embedded or implied in the shots of Howard. 
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Figw·e 2 
Well done fellas: Mr and Mrs Howard pose with the Snowy wor·kers 
(Sow·ce: http:jjwww.pm.gou.aujnewsjphoto_galle1·yjimg_roadjSnowy2jpg ) 
Milne (interview with author, 2006) refers to visual codes as 'buttons' 
designed to elicit certain responses from those judging the images. 
Although his government later tried to sell off the Snowy Mountains 
Corporation, at the time the Prime Minister was photographed with 
workers from the hydro-electric scheme (figure 2) readers of this picture 
would have formed a view of how appropriate it was for the PM to visit 
these representatives of an 'heroic' engineering marvel. It stands as an 
example of what Milne (interview with author, 2006) means when he says 
an "image can over-ride the actual message ... if they [the pictures] are 
strong enough, they will dictate how people will respond to the story". Note 
also the Akubra hats worn by the PM, Mrs Howard and the Member for 
Eden-Monaro, Gary Nairn, behind them. Bongiorno reflects: 
There is certain status, dignity and gravitas to being leader of a 
country. If you're the Prime Minister and you go to an informal 
setting . . . then surely you can wear your Akubra and your boots and 
have an open-neck shirt and perhaps be a little more accessible to 
the people who are allowed to be nearby. (Interview with author, 
2006) 
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Figw·e 3 
White House welcome: Greeting crowds and cameras 
(Soul'ce: http:/ jwww.nationmastel'.comjencyc/opediajJohn-Howal'd) 
Although there was a crowd on the lawns of the White House when this 
picture (figure 3) was taken, the waving by leaders is often done to provide 
movement and animation for the camera crews taking their shots from a 
safe distance away (Bongiorno, interview with author, 2006). It might best 
be summarised as the "theatrical aspect of the political sphere" (Minson in 
Burchell and Leigh, 2002, p. 135). On a previous visit to Washington, when 
Bush and Howard emerged from church, the President gave Howard a 
nudge to wave at the cameras. (D'Hage, 2005). 
Figul'e 4 
Ready with the flag over his shoulder: Prime Minister Howard in his Sydney office 
(Sow·ce: http:jjwww.wanadoojojmediasjimgjSGE.l1Y35·130406160723.photooo.quick/ook.defau/t-
245Xl7sjpg) 
John Howard will often use a flag behind him, as depicted in figure 4. 
Morris (interview with author, 2006) says this is "a simple device which 
conveys the impression of authority and of nationalism". While these traits 
will be further examined in the next chapter, the visual impacts can be 
explained thus: 
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It is very John Howard. It looks statesman-like. The alternative to 
such an approach is dull and flat, not sending any message or it can 
be distracting. There are other devices you would see in prime 
ministerial pictures. Say if you were shooting in his office, you'd 
probably see a family picture on display or a photograph of Mrs 
Thatcher. They all tell a message about him. (Morris, interview with 
author, 2006) 
Figure 5 
Centre of power: PM and Australian officials briefed by US Defence Minister at the 
Pentagon in Washington 
(Source: DoD Photo by R. D. Ward at www.dod.goujphotosjJul2005/050718-D-988oW-o2B.html) 
There is nothing accidental about the core elements of this picture (figure 
s). The PM and his image makers fully understand the importance of 
symbolism and symbolic props and use them to their advantage (Milne, 
interview with author, 2006). Nowhere is this more evident than in prime 
ministerial statements on foreign affairs or on trips abroad. 
You look at Howard at the White House recently with all that pomp 
and ceremony. You just can't go around that even though you know 
it's just been put on to send the message that we're standing side by 
side with America and all the rest of it. (Milne, interview with 
author, 2006) 
When the PM travels, an advance team from his office helps to plan the 
trips. According to Morris (interview with author, 2006), "all locations and 
opportunities are thought through in advance", adding that there is far 
greater control exercised now than there was a~ the start of Howard's term 
of office. In the early days, a number of things did not work out - "such as a 
day at the cricket at Lords when it rained and the PM was left looking like 
he didn't have enough do to" (interview with author, 2006) but lessons 
were learned for future planning. Morris elaborates: 
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The work of the advance team in the Prime Minister's Office ensures 
that they book the space in the places where the leader can do 
something for the media. They take into account matters like what 
would journalists want [in the picture] to depict the PM [in the 
location]. On the other hand, the media team is focused much more 
on content, making sure the PM is briefed properly (Interview with 
author, 2006). 
Milne reflects (interview with author, 2006) that when the PM travels, 
"controlling the environment" is the means of maximising the impact of 
symbolism. His minders pick the venues "but they are acutely aware, I 
think, of what he will do and won't do and of what is appropriate to his 
style". Devices readily employed include presidential-style podiums, flags, 
microphones that function properly and the cordoning of working media at 
a distance. 
It's orderly, even down to seating the media. I know that's a natural 
courtesy but what they don't like is the impressions of uncontrolled 
situations where microphones are stuffed up his nose or it's outside 
and reporters are up close and they're yelling questions. This is 
particularly in the case of the Prime Minister. Other ministers don't 
have that luxury. (Milne, interview with author, 2006) 
The flag, "a projection of patriotism and national identity", is fundamental 
(Milne, interview with author, 2006) such that it adorns every press 
conference and even has its own special container for transporting on 
prime ministerial travels abroad. 
Selling the message of the government of the day and its leader is not new. 
As Barnes (2005, p. 22 and 24) notes, the Whitlam and Fraser 
Governments took steps to promote their profiles. While he calls Whitlam's 
"somewhat chaotic public relations efforts", Barnes says Fraser was 
"actually aware of the ongoing importance of communicating the 
government's messages in a co-ordinated an controlled fashion to a media 
that had burgeoned since the Coalition was last in office in 1972". Today 
the public relations drive out of the national government is wall-to-wall. 
"We live in an age of government by PR", according to Orr and Tham 
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(2005). Every Minister has at least one public relations practitioner, every 
government department has at least one and every public agency has at 
least one. Most have many more than one. The cost runs into millions. 
Furthermore, as Young (2004, p. 78) notes, "the commercial PR industry 
backs up the publicly funded PR state". Projecting the image of a "popular 
celebrity politician", argues Louw (2005, p. 175), represents the ultimate 
success for spin doctors. 
In modern politics, public relations practice is powerful, deeply entrenched 
and essential to establishing advantage, especially when there is a lens in 
use. For the past decade in Canberra, many of those lenses have focused on 
the figure of John Howard whose journey as a political communicator is 
examined in detail in the second chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TALENT 
John Howard initially represented an enormous challenge for the public 
relations practitioners. So too for the working media, used to the 
charismatic and colourful leadership of the Hawke-Keating era. 
The Howard image, the central focus of this chapter, was previously more 
that of a dogged, honest survivor than a convincing electoral asset. 
"Howard didn't look all that exciting but he had one thing going for him," 
observes Bongiorno (interview with author, 2006), "and that was longevity 
and therefore credibility." When his party won the 1996 election, Howard's 
evolution as a political figure was just beginning. In summary, Howard 
progressed from being "comprehensively whacked at the polls, reduced to a 
figure of ridicule" in the 1980s (Price, 2005) to a high point where "today 
Howard seems invincible" (Brett cited in Henderson, 2005, p. 17), "on the 
verge of being as powerful and influential as his hero, Robert Menzies". 
(The Australian editorial, 2006) 
Howard's progression can be traced in part to his enunciation of key 
political convictions and policy decisions. Among the most striking have 
been his association with the armed forces, the fight against terrorism, the 
need to quell rebellious behaviour in fledgling neighbouring countries and 
various other aspects of the defence of the nation. The development of 
Howard's public image has relied heavily on his engagement on the 
international stage, beginning with East Timor in 1998 and revisited in 
2006. 
This association with the armed forces has tapped into Howard's ancestral 
connections (which are amplified later in this chapter) and has been 
exploited through numerous high-profile picture opportunities. Examples 
of such pictures abound, evidenced on web sites maintained by the Prime 
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Minister's Office and major newspapers (Photo Gallery and Fairfax), 
several of which feature in figures 6, 7 and 8 (below). As Sheridan (2005) 
notes, "the public love the military more than ever and they associate the 
military with Howard". 
Figul'e 6 
Sea of khaki: Prime Minister Howard thanks Australian troops in Dilifor their 
peacekeeping work. 
(Photo: Brendan Esposito, The Age 19 July 2006) 
Figur•e7 
Fare thee well: Prime Minister presides in Townsville in 2001 as soldiers depart on a 
dangerous overseas mission. 
(Sow·ce: http:jjwww.pm.gov.auj newsjphoto_galleryjimg_20-o8-o2/SoldiersNJpg) 
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FigureS 
Fmmed: Prime Minister Howard holds afmmed map of Banda Aceh he has signed, one 
of 10 made by the Combat Engineer Regiment to be presented to major units who 
participated in Opemtion Sumatra Assist (2005) 
(Source: www.dpmc.gov.auj. .. j imagesj photosjpLv:Bjpg ) 
Among the more notable and well-executed of the Prime Minister's pic facs 
have been his frequent appearances with members or returned members of 
the armed services. If there are troops to be farewelled or sailors to be 
welcomed home, the presence of the PM has been a familiar feature of such 
occasions in recent years. Morris (interview with author, 2006) has no 
doubt that pictures have been influential in developing the public 
association of Howard with the forces. But he sees nothing contrived in this 
effect, saying that although Howard had a natural understanding of 
milita1y matters, the decisions he had to take as Prime Minister were, 
nevertheless, difficult. 
The emergence of John Howard as a defender of the Australian national 
interest, chronicled by Brett (2003), Sheridan (2005) and Kelly (2005) 
among others, is a guide to the thinking behind the use of symbols in the 
communications tactics deployed to project a favourable public image for 
Howard. Bongiorno (interview with author, 2006) sees "the greatest 
symbolism ... when the Prime Minister turns up waving to the troops as he 
despatched them overseas to Iraq or wherever". Similarly, using an 
example of the PM abroad (such as figure 9 below), he notes: 
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The image of Howard visiting the troops in Iraq wearing a flak jacket 
and helmet would feed into somebody who commits the troops to a 
dangerous assignment and lends them moral support and is a 
courageous leader. Basically as Prime Minister he has the capacity to 
use the whole Defence force as a prop and he does so often and 
probably to great effect. (Bongiorno, interview with author, 2006) 
Figw·e 9 
PM in line of jil"e and lenses: Howal"d visiting troops in Baghdad 
(Source: Andrew Taylo•· - ReutersjCorbis, 25 July 2005, 
Fmm Encyclopaedia Britannica online at cache.eb.comjebjimage?id=84990) 
Milne (interview with author, 2006) corroborates: "Around here he 1s 
known as the Prime Minister for Defence." Consistent with Howard's 
comprehensive public relations strategies, such an image has a foundation 
in authenticity because "his links and affection for the army and military 
matters goes back to his own family histmy" (Morris, interview with 
author, 2006). Brett (2003) explains: 
Both his father and his grandfather fought in World War I and, as 
Prime Minister, Howard has been able to visit the sites of their 
wartime experiences. In many speeches he has embraced the 
national myth of Gallipoli 'where our nation's spirit was born'. (p. 
204) 
Another thread of consistency is the fact that one of Howard's first 
decisions when coming to power was to quarantine the Defence Forces 
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from budget cuts. As Milne sees it (interview with author, 2006): "It turned 
out to be a very prescient decision in the end. So he can claim rightly that 
he does deserve to be identified with the defence forces." 
Brett (2003, pp. 203-204) outlines the way in which John Howard as 
Prime Minister claimed the imagery of the 'Australian legend', a concept 
enunciated by historian Russel Ward in the 1950s. Ward's notion centred 
on the workers' experience, loyalty to mates and generosity, inter alia. 
Howard came to re-define these virtues as "more broadly popular forms of 
the Australian legend". Brett cites as an example Howard's praise for the 
surgeon hero of Changi, Sir Edward 'Weary' Dunlop, for his laconicism and 
mateship, his commitment to his country and selfless service to his men. 
She records that, like many Australian men, Howard is fascinated by the 
lessons of war, both for individuals and nations, and adds (p.204): 
"Howard's speeches are filled with characterisation of what he variously 
calls the 'Australian way', 'Australian values', the 'Australian identity' and 
the 'Australian character'." 
Brett's analysis is supported by Garran (2004, pp. 7-8) when referring to a 
device which Howard applies to help shape his new image: "creating a new 
story about Australia's identity". Bongiorno (interview with author, 2006) 
detects the same trend, a strengthening of the prime ministerial image by 
garnering patriotism: "Howard is a cultural warrior. He believes he has 
been given an opportunity to put an imprint, his philosophical imprint, on 
Australia." 
Further elucidation of these themes comes from Kelly (2005, p. 30) 
discussing the 6oth commemoration of the end of World War II when 
Howard, "invoked the patriotism that has gathered momentum under his 
leadership". Kelly writes: 
His life story instilled in Howard a faith in Australia's tradition and 
history, embodied in ultimate form on the battlefield, from Gallipoli 
to Kokoda. He has recruited the power of patriotism and the 
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'common man as hero' folklore to the service of the Liberal Party. 
His insights are acute precisely because Howard has the same cast of 
mind as the common man. He knows that nationalism is on the rise 
in Australia. 
(p. 30) 
Kelly's observations suggest explanations for many of the core themes 
behind the selection of photographic opportunities constructed during his 
decade in office. Morris (interview with author, 2006) sees no such 
contrivance, insisting that "it just so happens that defence and foreign 
policy issues are prominent in the recent political cycle". 
Howard is renowned for his discipline and drive to be in control. It is useful 
to tease out this characteristic to some degree because it is consistent with 
a hardline management of pic facs. For instance, Henderson (1998, pp. 7-
21), points to John Howard's pedantry and preference for protocol. There 
are other aspects of prime ministerial assertiveness. Kingston (p. 51) claims 
Howard ordered welcoming home parades for Australian troops from Iraq. 
She says although the troops were entitled to be met by the country's head 
of state [Governor-General], Howard "tore up our protocols and 
transformed himself into Australia's de-facto generalissimo". Kingston's 
insights suggest Howard's office is powerful, assertive and singularly 
bullish when it comes to controlling public impressions of who is in charge 
of the country and the nation's heart and soul, as in figures 10 and 11 below. 
Figw·es 10 and 11 
Representing the nation's heart and soul: 
Welcome home event for Middle East operations group (left) (June 2003) and 
comfo rting victim of London transport bombings (July 2005) 
(Source for fig ure 10: Defence Department from www.defence.gov.auf. . ./o40603/2003_S074_ 053}pg) 
(Source for fig ure 11: wwwg.sbs.com.aujtheworldnewsj reg ion.php?id=n... ) 
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Bongiorno provides corroboration: 
He realises that Sir William Deane [former Governor-general] had 
tapped into the mood of the body politic, the society, by going to 
Interlaken [in Switzerland] with the sprigs of wattle. He decided he 
did not want the Governor-General to be the chief mourner. He has 
become the chief mourner. He is the one who holds mourners in his 
arms and allows them to cry on his shoulder. He's the one who lays 
the wreaths, makes the speeches and turns up at key moments of 
national grief. (Interview with author, 2 006) 
Marr and Wilkinson (2003, p. 2 77) document the Howard camp's 
attachment to powerful pictorial images. A photograph used in Liberal 
Party election material in 2001 showed a resolute Howard with his fists 
clenched, flanked by flags, an image of a "determined Howard defending 
his country". Political creed and successful image need to be synchronised 
if one is to reinforce the other. Milne and others cited earlier argue that the 
parading of the Australian flag "is perfectly consistent with Howard's belief 
system", explaining: 
Always the PR, the set dressing, the symbolism and the imagery has 
got to be consistent with leader's belief and personality. The classic 
example where that fell to bits was when Latham became a leader, 
they had to fix up all those remarks about Bush and the rest of it. He 
held a meeting with the US ambassador and then came out and did a 
press conference. Someone from his office had stupidly put him 
between an Australian and American flag and it just bombed. Two 
months earlier he was saying everything bad about Bush and now 
just because you're leader, you expect us to believe you've changed 
your mind. That was a disaster for him because that became the 
story. (Interview with author, 2006) 
It is hardly surprising that powerful pictures, used as part of the armoury 
aimed at retaining office, inspired a Howard Government to favour such a 
construction of politically-inspired photo opportunities. Milne (interview 
with author, 2006) argues politicians can change the direction of a story by 
taking the opportunity for a good picture. For example, when the Prime 
Minister posed for pictures at the Special Air Service regiment's barracks 
after he farewelled another contingent leaving for Afghanistan, the 
backdrop was illuminating (see figure 12 below). 
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Figw•e12 
Signs of war in suburban Perth: Photographic set dressing reaches new heights? 
(Soutce: Post Newspapets, Petth - Photogmpher· Paul McGovem) 
Behind Howard is an assemblage of selected items of military equipment 
put there just for the occasion, according to a local press report: 
Security at the Special Air Service headquarters at Swanbourne was 
tightened after September 11, and that includes keeping the press off 
the base to photograph and interview the Prime Minister. So when 
John Howard rolled up again on Wednesday to farewell another 190 
troops off to Afghanistan, the SAS again brought the regiment 
outside. This involves wheeling out a stripped down, specially-built 
SAS six-wheeled Land Rover and leaving it in the car park outside. 
Then a camouflage net is strung up on the fence behind it, and the 
PM and his Defence Minister, Robert Hill, park themselves in front 
of the whole Hollywood set. Television viewers around Australia, 
unaware of the subterfuge with tight camera shots, have the distinct 
impression that the PM is being interviewed in the inner sanctum of 
Australia's much loved elite special force. (Movie-set props for PM 
at SAS, 2005, p. 4). 
Milne says this event "was just like a theatrical production" (interview with 
author, 2006). This was done especially for the purpose of making Howard 
appear in charge of the nation's defence, even to the extent of placing guns 
in view of the cameras. 
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In a similar vein, Mares (2001, p. 134) labels the 2001 poll the khaki 
election, successfully fought over the issues of border protection and 
security against terrorism. Given the subsequent recovety of political 
stocks, it is little wonder the khaki theme has become a recurring one 
during Howard's recent years in office, dominating his international 
travels, his rhetoric and many of his more striking TV appearances. 
Figw•e13 
Wrapped: PM honoured in Sydney at the presentation by the US Government of the 
Woodrow Wilson award in 2005 
(Source: photos.reuters.comj PicturesjgalleriesjStories ... ) 
Bongiorno believes pictures, such as figure 13 above, have been absolutely 
influential in associating the PM with national security and an 
international coalition formed around a fight against terrorism, frequently 
equated to war. 
This one picture does everything he'd want done in the sense [that it 
says] however close Bob Hawke or even Paul Keating was to the US 
presidents, he has enmeshed Australia with its greatest ally and is 
wrapped in the security blanket of the American flag which all the 
opinion polls in Australia show is a huge plus. That picture would be 
one that Howard couldn't really pay for. (Interview with author, 
2006) 
Howard's attachment to evocative images has, on occasions, drawn 
criticism. For instance in the 2004 election campaign, Schubert (2004) 
reported that the PM's party issued a glossy brochure using pictures of 
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soldiers and of Howard with the national flag. His opponents claimed he 
was exploiting the military for political purposes. 
Sport is another platform often chosen to portray the prime ministerial 
passion. Australia's sporting obsessions are well understood and again 
Howard's embrace of sporting contests and heroes is no mere concoction. 
Morris says Howard likes certain sports (interview with author, 2006) but 
his tastes have limitations. Milne points out that the Prime Minister has 
never been to the Melbourne Cup: 
Tony O'Leary, his press secretary, has said: It's just not him. He's 
from a Methodist background. He doesn't like gambling. It just 
would not look right. So I think that's a good example. Hawke went 
to the Melbourne Cup all the time and everyone said 'of course, 
where else would he be on Melbourne Cup day?'. (Interview with 
author, 2006) 
How does John Howard seem to hit the right note so consistently with his 
media image? It is the result of extraordinary diligence and cultivated 
acumen. By every measure, he has put in the hard yards. He reads the daily 
newspapers assiduously (Bongiorno, interview with author, 2006) and it 
has made him something of a natural when it comes to understanding the 
nuances and implications of how politics are reported to the Australian 
public and being able to respond accordingly. As Oakes (2oo6a) testifies, 
Howard "briefs himself on everything that's in the media from the moment 
he gets up in the morning, and he knows how to use it". Hence the PM is 
rarely a victim of media coverage; he is overwhelmingly a controller of the 
coverage. Bongiorno labels Howard (interview with author, 2006) "his own 
best press secretary". Milne notes that the PM and his chief media adviser 
O'Leary have been together for a decade, adding in the specific context of 
pic facs: "They know each other's minds pretty well so it's almost Howard 
picking his [media] venues by proxy and he doesn't do anything he doesn't 
want to" (interview with author, 2006). 
As 'talent' for media coverage, Prime Minister Howard has reached an 
unparalleled high point in Australian political history. No previous national 
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leader has been as ubiquitous in his media exposure. It is a record driven 
by two main forces: John Howard's natural propensity to be a 
"consummate consumer and user of the media" (Taylor, 2005) and the 
"enormously successful information management on the part of the 
Howard government" (Kelly, radio interview, 2006). In this respect, Kelly 
argues, Howard has really altered the nature of the prime ministership. He 
observes: "No Prime Minister has spent as much time on the media or on 
the message as John Howard does ... he's perfected the art of the 
permanent campaign, and he's got enormous resources." 
According to Canberra press gallery veterans like Oakes, "John Howard 
himself is the most media-savvy Prime Minister we've ever had" (Oakes, 
2006b). By any historical measure, the Howard leadership profile today 
represents a massive transformation of the man and the office, the product 
of longevity, ardour and unremitting attention to media appearances. How 
this impacts on the working media is the subject of the third chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TRANSMITTERS 
More people work in the Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery than there 
are elected members of Australia's national Parliament (Federal 
Parliamentary Press Gallery contact details, 2004). This chapter examines 
those gallery members and their relationships with the Howard political 
machine. 
The access and opportunity for the gallery's journalists to report the news 
is invariably shaped by political public relations practitioners because there 
is such an abundance of them filling roles as gatekeepers and influential 
shapers of their masters' communications. As previously highlighted, this is 
particularly true in the crucible that is Canberra. Kelly (1995, p. 257) quotes 
journalist Peter Wilmoth of The Sunday Age (1994): "The system of 
reporting Canberra has always, of course, been a symbiotic process which 
needs to meet the demands of high-turnover journalism and publicity-
sensitive (or ravenous) politicians." According to Bongiorno (interview with 
author, 2006), the politicians who inhabit Canberra "are becoming more 
sophisticated and their access to the media is increasingly managed and 
manipulated". 
In the news production process, the availability of key interviewees (what is 
termed 'talent' in the previous chapter) and the day-to-day operational 
routines of news crews "will have influenced the kinds of decisions taken 
about what news can be covered" (Selby and Cowdery, 1995, pp. 141-143). 
Scammel (1996, pp. 122-136) focuses on the example of long-serving 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979-90), arguing that she 
"presided over the introduction and intensification of the techniques of 
marketing". Scammel insists Thatcher's extraordinary success "ensured 
that her methods were the model to copy". Such a model has not gone 
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unnoticed by Mrs Thatcher's politically aligned counterparts in Australia's 
Liberal Party. 
The nature of news gathering, especially for television, gives rise to a notion 
called "primary definers" in news coverage (Selby and Cowdery, 1995, p. 
141). The input from or comments of 'official bodies', such as the Thatcher 
or Howard offices, makes them primary definers because of their inherent 
importance in establishing a news story. However, Bongiorno and his 
colleagues (interviews with author, 2006) argue that despite the 
contrivances of the public relations machinery, it is not mere puffery which 
gets reported. Re-affirming the concept of primary definers, governments 
make genuine news, notwithstanding the public relations hoopla. Milne 
highlights the symbiotic character of the linkages between news maker and 
news reporter. The maker needs the reporter, he insists: 
On the Prime Minister's overseas trips, for instance, he bends over 
backwards, more than usual, to make sure we get into pic facs, to 
ensure we get the hand-shaking beforehand - the grip and grit 
before any talks - because he needs to portray the image of a Prime 
Minister hard at work, not just junketing around the place. He needs 
to keep his presence up. And he also knows he needs to respond to 
whatever's happening at horne so, particularly in the case of 
overseas trips, the power balance is a bit different. Whereas when he 
is at horne, he is master of his own domain. (Interview with author, 
2006) 
The specific case of the Prime Minister as a primary definer is discussed a 
little later in this chapter. 
In Howard's Canberra, a mutual dependence can be demonstrated between 
media crews and those in power, at least in operational terms. Morris 
states (interview with author, 2006): "They would die without each other." 
After all, as Craig (2004, p. 83) notes, they spend up to 90 per cent of their 
working day in the same 'hothouse' building, Parliament House. 
The analysis of Bongiorno underlines this inter-dependence and also finds 
virtue in it: 
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I mean they cannot do without each other. In fact that is the role 
ascribed to us [the press] in a democratic society. There used to be a 
great quote from Jefferson on the masthead of the Courier-Mail 
[newspaper] in Brisbane. It goes along the line that you cannot 
constrain the freedom of the press without constraining the freedom 
of society. It's only in a free society that you can have a free press. 
Free in the sense of capable of holding the elected representatives to 
account. Then of course they too need us to communicate what they 
are doing. (Interview with author, 2006) 
Using the tools of the written and spoken word, journalists are required to 
apply objectivity to news reporting but the same may not be possible with 
pictures when power brokers and gatekeepers orchestrate the settings 
available to cameras. News crews stationed in Canberra are inevitably at 
the mercy of Howard's media appearances for access and content. Do 
media workers and politicians tend to create a 'staged world', a reality of 
their own? Morris believes this to be the case: 
Canberra is an artificial place. The Parliament and the people in it 
occupy a little world unto themselves. In that setting, the politicians 
have enormous power to generate news. The place is a mixture of a 
club, a game, a mutual admiration and a mutual hatred. (Interview 
with author, 2006) 
So there is a pronounced inter-dependence between reporting politics and 
occupying political office. For instance, the influence of the media in 
modern life, especially politics, is thoroughly canvassed in Craig's work 
(2004). He argues that media shapes the very nature of modern public life, 
summarised in the phrase, 'mediated public life'. He adds: "The public 
generally do not directly encounter politicians and public issues but rather 
encounter media images, representations and stories about those 
politicians and public issues" (2004, p. 4). With the exception of talk-back 
radio, which should probably warrant a study of its own around its 
audience's capacity to engage politicians on the callers' terms, the 
'mediation' of national public life would seem to be an unquestionable 
truth given the massive separation of Australia's federal political fulcrum 
from its population centres. 
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The structure of media operations in Australia's national capital is highly 
pertinent in this context. Gelber (1994, pp. 23-24), in examining trends in 
Australian public affairs in the mid-1990s, describes the concentration of 
news management in Canberra as "quite remarkable". As a result, he 
identifies the press gallery as acquiring "an increasingly influential role in 
formulating the nation's agenda for discussion". Government media 
officers play a decisive role, according to Gelber, because of the massive 
resources at the disposal of an incumbent government. In discussing "the 
production chains of political communications", Moloney, Richards, 
Scullion and Daymon (2003, p. 166) identify the "dominance of spin as the 
ruling form of news management". 
Linden (1997, p. 32) refers to the media's hunger for pictures and the way 
politicians take advantage of this. He argues that "these types of pictures 
help to create a desirable image of the person being photographed". This 
value of assessment is enhanced by Craig's observation that news media 
visual images generate credibility (2004, p. 97). 
The editors of the British Journal of Photography (4 May 2005) 
interviewed professional photographers in Britain about the challenges of 
photographing politicians today. This task, the journal concluded, has 
never been harder, adding: "Media access has become increasingly 
restricted and the politicians progressively better groomed as they and 
their assistants try to control the image they present to the public". Jeff 
Mitchell of Reuters complains of everything being "so stage-managed now . 
. . far too controlled" (British Journal of Photography, 2005). 
Milne (interview with author, 2006) believes this observation absolutely 
applies to the Australian Prime Minister. He notes: "The more senior you 
are, the more controlled the environment but in the case of the Prime 
Minister completely. There is no uncontrolled access to him except maybe 
socially." Morris (interview with author, 2006) says while photographers 
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would always prefer to catch people off guard, the politicians prefer media 
access to be a lot more structured. The scale of Parliament House in 
Canberra contributes to this segregation, as do security concerns. Media 
operatives are restricted in their access to parts of the Parliament building 
by the isolation of members-only areas and screening and tighter control of 
movements. 
The tendency of politicians and media players to create the 'staged world' 
referred to earlier in this chapter is accepted with resignation by Milne 
(interview with author, 2006) who says it has a brutal truth because the 
gallery members have little say in it. He elaborates: 
We would prefer that it was completely unstructured. We would like 
to be able to walk into the Prime Minister's office and throw a few 
questions at him any time of the day or night. So, at base, no I don't 
think we are complicit. Having said that, because of the control 
features of the office, we do become complicit because we need the 
pictures - in particular the pictures - we need the access so we 
abide by the rules because that's the only way we can get the access. 
But do we like it? No. 
According to Bongiorno, the press gallery in Canberra concentrates 
basically on Prime Minister Howard as leader: "Incumbency favours the 
leader of a government" (interview with author, 2006). In her fly-on-the-
wall narrative about the workings of the press gallery in Australia's 
Parliament House, Simons (1999, p.13) identifies several inter-connected 
strands: the dominance of a leader in media coverage, the natural 
supremacy of government announcements and the time-critical and access-
sensitive operational constraints of a centralised media operation. 
The Gallery literally lives in Canberra. Its ranks have a typically slower 
turnover than other reporting rounds in . Australian media outlets, 
according to the chief executive officer of News Limited (Hartigan, 2004). 
Its members have a daily obligation to help fill a certain amount of space in 
their employers' newspapers and airwaves. They must inevitably rely for a 
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quotient of their reporting output on the 'prime definers' such as the PM. 
Morris has no doubt leaders have the ability to set the news agenda: 
The office of this Prime Minister has a particular power to set an 
agenda and to adjust that agenda. It is an enormous power. It 
revolves around the understanding that while ordinary politicians 
can talk about things, it is the leaders who can do things. So when a 
leader is saying something or making an announcement or unveiling 
a decision it becomes real. For example, if the leader is announcing 
the despatch of troops to fight overseas, it makes sense to do that in 
an army setting. If the leader is making an announcement about 
water resources, it makes sense to do that alongside a river or dam. 
(Interview with author, 2006) 
Similarly Bongiorno recognises the public relations-inspired selection of 
venues for new project, program and policy announcements by 
government, citing the examples of a child-care centre for a major resource 
allocation for child care or a road construction site for an announcement of 
funding for a new highway. He pinpoints why journalists cannot avoid such 
tactics: 
There is no doubt there is a lot of PR in all of that but what makes it 
news is that if you're in government you can announce at this site, 
with this prop, with this PR, something that is real and new. 
(Interview with author, 2006) 
In exploring this ability of governments to offer the media little choice in 
the presentation of announcements, Bongiorno also highlights the extent to 
which the leader's public relations and political strategists will sometimes 
go in order to continue to accrue mileage, that is, coverage of the PM 
transmitting political messages via the media. He says (interview with 
author, 2006) Howard has travelled to southern China three times to 
support and preside over the sale of LNG from Australia's North-West 
Shelf. The deal has been announced and re-announced on each occasion. 
He went there again for the arrival of the inaugural supply of the gas. 
Bongiorno poses: 
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Is it real? Yes, it is real. Is it news? Well, it is not brand new, no. Is 
the arrival of the first shipment news? Yes, but it is not really hard 
news. So there is an example of spending a hell of a lot of money for 
a very expensive picture facility (pic fac) which reinforces that his 
government is on about cementing trade with China which is of 
course now an engine room of the Australian economy if not a lot of 
other economies as well. (Interview with author, 2006) 
Thomson (1997, pp. 11-12) considers the importance of appearance in 
building political reputations. She notes the view of historian Andrew 
Roberts about the importance of "good props". These are identifiers for the 
readers and viewers of political coverage. If props are indeed seen as 
legitimate aids to public recognition, it strengthens an interpretation of 
Prime Minister Howard's regular donning of a wide-brimmed hat as a 
means of reinforcing his brand of mateship and conveying an impression 
that he handles harsh environments and empathises with those facing 
hardship, as figure 14 (below) illustrates. 
Figm•e 14 
For all Australians: Prime Min ister visits the Aboriginal community of Wadeye, NT 
(Source: http:jjwww.theage.com.aujnews/Nationaf/Aborigina/-shakeup-
p/an/2005/02/28/1109546796525.html) 
Linden (1997, p. 32) refers to the media's hunger for pictures and the way 
politicians take advantage of this. He argues that "these types of pictures 
help to create a desirable image of the person being photographed". 
Scammel (1996, pp. 122-136) takes this line of reasoning further when he 
suggests that marketing influences "the tone and tenor" of actual policy 
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stances. This effect resonates in Howard's case where constructed photo 
opportunities reinforce the flavour of policy positions, especially those 
pertaining to traits, described by Brett (cited in Manne, 2004, p. 86), such 
as nationalism or practical mateship - meaning in essence, Australians 
supporting Australians . Hence a prevailing and sustained theme in 
Howard's photo opportunities is an empathy with defence force personnel, 
volunteers and victims of tragedy. The August 2006 announcement of an 
increase in the size of the Australian Army is an illustration of a pic fac 
constructed to add weight to a policy decision of the government. Figure 15 
shows the PM in the presence of the chiefs of each of the three branches of 
the armed services and the flags representing each arm. The picture was 
taken at Defence Department headquarters. 
Top brass:_lieur.n•nt Genmll'l!ler Leihy, left, Air Chief Marshal Anaus lfoullon, 
Derrnu~ Mmistrr Brendin Nelson and Prime Minister John Howard yesterday 
Figure15 
Pklur.:- llbrt Gnhun I 
Fronting all the brass: PM's preferred style of announcing army expansion. 
(Source: The Australian, 25 August 2006, p . 4) 
In years past, a Prime Minister making such an announcement normally 
would have chosen to make a statement to the Parliament, but particularly 
during the Howard decade in power there has been a marked shift away 
from the formal forum of Parliament towards settings contrived in such a 
way as to offer appeal to the press and 'IV cameras. In this case, the scale 
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and gravity of such an announcement would always attract reportage by 
gallery members, but by orchestrating and 'dressing' the chosen site for the 
announcement, the Prime Minister is also offering the working media a 
greater degree of visual lure. Such an approach typifies the way in which 
the Canberra gallery is almost inevitably 'captured' by the PM's tactics. 
Herman's essay, Gatekeeper Versus Propaganda Models: A critical 
American perspective, (cited in Golding, Murdock and Schlesinger, 1986, 
pp. 172-176) further explores the inter-dependence between news seeker 
and news maker. The symbolism inherent in figure 15 resonates strongly 
when considering Herman's observations: 
News organisations seek efficient sources of authoritative and 
credible news on a regular basis. These are interconnected: the more 
authoritative and credible the source, the easier it is to accept 
statements without checking, and the less expensive is news-
making. Furthermore, assertions of high authority are news-worthy 
in and of themselves ... the source that best meets these standards 
is, of course, the government. (p. 172) 
While it would be misguided to suggest the Canberra press gallery is 
anything but fiercely questioning of the Prime Minister's media output 
within the news gathering process, nevertheless, for the reasons Herman 
identifies, it could be argued that the resultant coverage is invariably going 
to reflect at least some measure of prime ministerial flavour and/ or 
atmospherics. Herman says in foreign policy, especially, governments have 
a unique position as primary news source, giving them "tremendous 
manipulative powers" (p.172). The literature on the post-1996 
Government's activities in the field of foreign policy suggest these powers 
are not lost on Howard and his Ministers nor resisted by the media 
practitioners responsible for filling air waves and print columns. Contrast, 
for example, the reporting of the occasional ministerial visits to Baghdad 
with the regular on-the-ground reporting from the same city. When 
ministers are involved, the content of news reports reflects the ministerial 
activities but when daily life in the Iraqi capital is the subject of reporting, 
the emphasis in the news is on the ongoing conflict and violence. This 
Page 38 of 66 
example illustrates the potency of Herman's concept of primary news 
source. 
Bongiorno concurs on the extent of manipulative powers available to the 
occupants of office. He summarises the prevailing state of affairs in 
Canberra (interview with author, 2006): "This government is very tight in 
its management of news sources." He uses an example in which visual 
images played a critical part: 
One of the most shameful exploitations of imagery was the 
declaration of war on the Tampa. The Tampa was a mercy ship and 
we declared war on it. They [the Australian authorities] closed down 
the air space so the news helicopters could not go to it. They did not 
want any images of asylum seekers women and children. They 
banned all photography. It wasn't until the Daily Telegraph in 
Sydney got e-mailed images from the ship and put them on the front 
page that people began to realise that these were actually human 
beings. They were able to claim, for instance, that no-one's life was 
at risk; however, when the military doctors went on board the 
Tampa there were women nearly dying due to dehydration. They 
weren't allowed to be taken off the ship but had to be hydrated on 
the deck of the ship. We sent in the SAS, for God's sake, in full black 
military gear with sub-machine guns and the rest of it which painted 
the image, reinforced back in Australia, that the Tampa was a threat 
to our security. (Interview with author, 2006) 
Bongiorno calls it probably the most shameful exploitation of imagery by a 
desperate government behind in the polls at the beginning of that year. He 
concludes that it was a ruthless exploitation of fear in the community. 
Those who spend their days reporting national politics in Australia would 
have little room to move if they wanted to spurn the Government's highly 
structured communications strategies. The "increased use of media 
advisers, media units and of overt and covert PR strategies for maximising 
favourable news coverage and containing unwanted publicity" (Ward and 
Stewart, 2006, p. 204) ensures that after a decade of the Howard 
supremacy, the press gallery comprises journalists and photographers 
unavoidably, if undesirably, cast as transmitters of the Government's 
messages. Milne summarises the dilemma thus: 
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The truth is if the pictures are too good, they will run, even though 
my instincts journalistically may be 'look, I know I'm being conned 
here'. But the fact of the matter is you can't get around the pictures. 
And of course, if you don't run them, your competitors will and your 
news editor will put a boot up your arse. So in that sense, we can be 
captive [to PR]. (Interview with author, 2006) 
From the point of view of the supreme public relations strategist, Morris 
has a blunt and unapologetic message for the working media: 
Let's face it, there is more PR than ever and the media just has to 
deal with it. I can't imagine a news editor or a TV editor would be 
very impressed if a reporter just declared they were not going to 
cover a certain story just because there was a PR person involved in 
organising it. (Interview with author, 2006) 
From the point of view of some leading lights of political journalism, it is 
regrettable. Blumer and Gurevitch (cited in Curran and Gurevitch, 2005, p. 
108) talk of the sensitivity of journalists being "affronted" by politicians' 
attempts to manage the news in their favour. Pilger (2005) says Australia 
has one of the most "restricted medias in the Western world ... journalists 
are very close to politicians". Meade (2006) reports that one ofthe doyens 
of the Canberra gallery, Michelle Grattan, of The Age, according to her 
editor, is no longer interested in travelling abroad with the Prime Minister 
because access to him is so limited. Salter (2006) finds that the PM and his 
senior ministers have enjoyed an extraordinarily easy ride from the media: 
"This has been achieved not so much by the cultivation of proprietorial 
benevolence as through the masterful manipulation of the political agenda 
and limits within which the media's version of public debate has been 
confined." Gawenda (2005) concludes: "Even the best reporters can get too 
close to their contacts, too cosy with them." 
As to what the public makes of it all, the next chapter analyses the electoral 
dynamics of the Howard image. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TARGETS 
According to opinion polls, the Australian electorate at large has 
progressively felt more comfortable with the Howard prime ministership, 
identifying him with a range of attributes which, while perhaps failing to 
earn a passionate embrace, have served to attract respect and a sense of 
reliability. Pollster Gary Morgan (cited at roymorgan.com, 2006) notes: 
"Howard's experience over many years was frequently mentioned in special 
qualitative research - it is clear he has built and maintained significant 
trust with electors". Among the attributes are a number that have been 
regularly conveyed and reinforced by the media's visual portrayal of the 
Prime Minister. As discussed in the second chapter above, for instance, 
Howard has readily stepped out as a consoler and comforter in the face of 
tragedies besetting Australians. Using the example of the Port Arthur 
massacre (1996) and the first Bali terrorist bombings (2002), Morris recalls 
the Prime Minister comforting distressed survivors and relatives of victims 
and concludes: "The pictures work because John Howard is naturally nice." 
(Interview with author, 2006) 
The judgements and emotions aroused by media images rate as important, 
according to Milne (interview with author, 2006): 
As much as judging the images, I would say more accurately that 
[people] respond to them - whether they think their leader looks 
appropriate, looks strong . . . those sorts of buttons I think. Often the 
image can over-ride the actual message, that is, in print the written 
word and in television the voice-over. If they [the pictures] are strong 
enough, they will dictate how people will respond to the story. 
If the essential purpose of effective political leadership is to engage the 
support of the electorate at large, identified here as 'the targets', the 
measure of Howard's success is the primary focus of this penultimate 
chapter. 
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Among the most simple yet striking testaments to Howard's triumph are 
his election victories and his consistent ratings in public opinion polling. 
Newspoll, in conjunction with The Australian newspaper, regularly surveys 
a sample of voters. Among other things, these polls test how satisfied 
respondents are with the way Howard is doing his job. As figure 16 (below) 
illustrates, in the past five years, the PM's satisfaction rating has averaged 
52 per cent. This measure of approval corresponds with typical 
observations collected by the Morgan poll in its qualitative research. Here 
is a recent example: 
� 0 
"He's got the runs on the board, so to speak, and this experience 
generates trust", "He has won four elections, and is better than any 
other Prime Minster for a long time", "He's really proved himself', 
"Better the devil you know", "John Howard is a proven performer", 
"John Howard has kept the country on the right track, it's gone 
forward with him", "John Howard has more experience and makes 
the tough decisions when they need to be made". (Morgan, 2006) 
Satisfaction with Howard 
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Figure16 
I• Series1 I 
Rarely below 50 per cent: Satisfaction ratings for the Prime Minister for past.five years 
(Source: Newspo/1 results averaged by author) 
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certified 
To what extent poll results reflect satisfaction with performance as distinct 
from effective branding and salesmanship is open to question. Ruddock 
(2001, p. 8o) stresses that "public opinion can be seen as the product of 
informed, rational minds, or it can be seen as the product of politically 
motivated manipulation by political elites, the mass media or both". At the 
same time Morgan measures public expectations on which major political 
party is likely to hold office at a given time. From a strong majority, who 
expects the Liberal-National coalition to be ascendant, some typical views 
are recorded: 
Supporters were impressed with the L-NP Government and the 
leadership of John Howard, with comments such as: 'John Howard has 
handled the country well', 'I agree with most of what John Howard does 
- I am confident in his abilities', 'I am very happy with John Howard 
and his Government'. (Morgan, 2005) 
Taylor (2005) believes the PM's office is "obviously doing something right", 
adding:"'The boss' has won four elections. Over all those years his 
satisfaction ratings have seldom fallen below 50 per cent. He has reformed 
the economy and shifted the social and cultural zeitgeist of the nation." 
It is illuminating to consider the link between a government's policy and 
the way it is 'sold'. Reith (2001, pp. 742-743) cites a book by Jacobs and 
Shapiro in which they identify "dynamic configurations and processes of 
inter-dependence" of policy making, media coverage and public opinion. 
They claim that democratic governance and the process of public 
communications are inseparably linked. John Howard's style of 
photographed 'set piece' occasions would seem to recognise such a link 
because these events feed his acceptance by the electorate as a leader of 
substance and relevance. The visual impact of Howard's appearances 
enhances the poignancy of his pitch. For insta~ce, the PM's message about 
steadfastly 'finishing the job' (as in continuing military deployment in 
Iraq), while he is pictured standing shoulder-to-shoulder with a soldier or a 
world leader, as in figure 17 below, is more penetrating than a line 
delivered at the despatch box of the House of Representatives. 
Page 43 of 66 
Figw•e17 
Brothers in ar·ms: Howard and Bush in a joint news confer·ence in Washington 
(Sow·ce: AP Plwtoj Gerold Herbe1·t accessed from www.washingtonpost.comj wp-
dynjcontentj photoj politicsjindex.html). 
To win approval with the voting public, the most successful leaders might 
take one of two routes: let a natural brilliance shine as they excel in the 
performance of their office or, in the absence of such a gift, parade a degree 
of sheer ordinariness with which the citizenry may find an affinity. The 
mission is to strike and sustain the right chord with people while ensuring 
they believe that as leader you know what you are doing. Howard has 
cultivated this ability and reaped the rewards of polling triumphs. 
In John Howard's case, numerous examples of hitting the correct chord are 
documented here. Figures 18 and 19 (below) reflect the aforementioned 
prime ministerial penchant for sporting contests and competitors, what 
Bongiorno (interview with author, 2006) calls an association with the 
Australian sporting ethos. 
Figure18 
C'mon Aussie: Howard joins fans at Australia's Davis Cup team in Melbourne in 2003 
(Sow·ce: www.daviscup.comj. . .j gal/eryj DC_ 2336_ gal/ery.JPG) 
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Figure 19 
Captain to captain: The PM launched the biography of retired Australian cricket captain 
Steve Waugh in Sydney in 2005. 
(Source: www.cenh·a/chronicle.comj 20051024/24aJpg) 
According to Bongiorno, Howard, like [former prime minister] Bob Hawke 
"was already a cricket tragic and sport nut", so the Howard fondness for 
sporting contests is genuine even if the way he manifests this passion is 
"exploitative". (Interview with author, 2006) 
While sport provides prime ground for a leader to align himself with the 
competitors, warriors and heroes commonly idolised by ordinary citizens, 
who are themselves identified as 'Howard's battlers', the same s01t of 
thinking can be extended to a range of other fronts. In previous chapters 
above, attention has been given to Prime Minister Howard's ability to reach 
out to the nation's hea1t and soul on the occasions of dire drama. But he 
can achieve a similar impact on a more modest and frequent scale simply 
by ensuring he figures almost incessantly in the nation's news chronicle. 
The media has changed significantly since the start of the 1990s, driven by 
technological developments which "continue to create new distribution 
platforms for information and entertainment content" (Peters, 2005). The 
number of media outlets has proliferated and, in Australian households 
and workplaces, the spectrum of news and information sources available to 
ordinary consumers has risen markedly. Platforms including pay 
television, online services and mobile phones, according to Peters (2005), 
"have experienced strong growth to date". Morris notes: "Today's media 
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cycle is so rapid" (interview with author, 2006). Often in the most simple, 
unstylish ways, John Howard has been able to ride this wave of constant 
media production. The best example is the morning "totemic power walk" 
(Milne, interview with author, 2006). 
According to Milne, the walk (figure 20) suggests a great deal: 
It's not just a walk. It shows he's fit; it shows he's determined; and 
he does it in a green and gold track suit which sends another 
message. At the time we were going into the Iraq war, there was a 
group of protesters who ambushed him outside Kirribilli House on 
his morning power walk. The whole issue was tested in focus groups 
by the Liberal Party and that incident was recalled. The focus group 
didn't care about the demonstration or the war. All that impressed 
them was the fact that the protesters were mostly young and 
Howard outpaced them. That's the message voters took out of that, 
not about the war at all. (Interview with author, 2006) 
Figure20 
Exercise of power: John Howard's morning 'constitutional' walk has become an icon for 
the cameras that capture the daily news cycle 
(So urce: www.melbourne2oo6.com.ouj M2oo6jHomepoge+Newsj. . .) 
Price (2006, July) also reads much into the PM's dawn patrol: "That much-
filmed morning walk is now as important to the PM's image as it is for his 
general health. Ignore the gaudy tracksuits and you can discern Howard's 
energy, self-discipline and single-mindedness in every furious step." 
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Katauskas (2006) agrees: "He [Howard] knows that the walk is a PR 
exercise. He knows it's saying 'I'm young, I'm fit and I'm still in control'." 
Figw•e21 
Cheerleader: Howard allowed press photographers into the Lodge in the middle of the 
night to capture him watching Australia play Croatia in the World Cup Soccer 
(Source : The Weekend Australian, June 24-25, 2006) 
The walk is typical of the recurring ways the Prime Minister manages to 
buy into the round-the-clock news cycle, well illustrated by the example in 
figure 21 above. Megalogenis (2006) says: "No-one manages the 24-hour 
news cycle better than John Howard." The Prime Minister himself is quite 
candid about this trend: 
I thought the media was a big part of my life when I became Prime 
Minister. I had no idea what a big part of my life it would be over the 
last ten years. If it was all pervasive and omnipresent in 1996, it is 
doubly or trebly so in 2006. We do live in a 24 hour news cycle, 7 
days a week. (News Room, PM's web site) 
Price (2006, March) observes: "These days the PM makes himself available 
for funerals, natural disasters, moments of sporting heroism, bar mitzvahs, 
weddings, anything." As a result, using the example of the PM's many 
appearances at Commonwealth games events in Melbourne, Price finds 
Howard earns a "weird supermodel treatment everywhere he goes". In 
essence, the philosophy guiding the Howard image might be stated simply 
as: If you do things that connect you with the punters, your esteem will 
grow. 
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Establishing a persona with genuinely good intentions has had another 
major benefit for Howard. He's been able to use this technique to quell or 
even reverse what on the surface would appear to be a paradox. His 
commitment to truth is questionable, according to a number of 
authoritative commentators. In essence, blanketing the news cycle with 
endless contributions to the thoughts and affairs of the nation would seem 
to have allowed him to get away with lies, contradictions and back-flips. 
Bongiorno (interview with author, 2006) notes that Howard is "capable of 
saying one thing and doing the exact opposite . . . something he has 
mastered and seems to be forgiven for" by the general populace and media 
commentators. 
Grant (2006) depicts Howard as a shrewd politician who keeps his finger 
on the public pulse "and shows his feelings only on immaculate occasions". 
At the same time, he believes that during the Howard decade in office "the 
record of cagey political management has lengthened." He provides this 
analysis: 
In public debate, the Prime Minister nips and tucks, using words, 
especially adjectives, carefully so that he can later disown 
sentiments that he had seemed earlier to be endorsing. As he is 
neither a blatant bigot nor simple-minded, he does not appear to be 
lowering standards, whether of competence or morality. He appears, 
rather, to be trying to be sensible. But the effect is that the issue is 
allowed to crumble or evaporate in a flurry of self-protective 
corrections, refinements and denials, as well as complex, 
bureaucratic outcomes. (Grant, 2006) 
Citing the stand-off between Howard and his deputy over a future 
leadership transfer, Oakes (2oo6b) is more blatant: "John Howard is 
exposed as a purveyor of porkies and his support grows." He notes the 
punters want Howard [to stay on], saying "they don't care if he lied". 
Grattan (2006) brings the matter back to the bottom line upon which this 
chapter is focused: the Prime Minister's popularity with the electorate. She 
notes: " . . . polling has reinforced an established point: people think 
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Howard is loose with the truth, but when it comes to running the country, 
that doesn't worry them." Illustrating her argument, Grattan reports that 51 
per cent of people polled in September 2004, considered Howard has 
'generally been dishonest' about the so-called children overboard affair, yet 
despite this controversy over his truthfulness, Howard made 'trust' a 
successful election theme that same year. It seems Grant (1999, p. 68) was 
close to the mark when, referring to illustrations from the office of New 
Zealand's first woman prime minister Jenny Shipley- boasting a coterie of 
spin doctors - he argued "prime ministers never tell it as it actually is". 
Howard's justification for sending troops to Iraq, centred on weapons of 
mass destruction, is another example where sincerity and the sort of allies 
you might find on a Texas ranch, reinforced in media images such as figure 
22, have generated strong waves of absolution. Shanahan (2005) observes 
that satisfaction with Howard "rose back above so per cent in Newspoll" 
after a trip to meet Bush in Washington, Blair in London and Australian 
troops in Baghdad. 
Figure22 
Alongside the US: the PM's case for war in Iraq may have evaporated 
but his credibility alongside a powe1ful ally remains intact 
(Sow·ce: www.voanews.comjkorean/ Archivejimagesjpool_o3 ... ) 
Partly by way of explaining such phenomenon, Morris argues people have 
long known what Howard stands for: 
Everyone who enters politics starts as a blank canvas. By the time 
one might rise to the position of leader, you would hope that two-
thirds of that canvas would be filled in with the public's perception 
of who you are and what you're on about. Now, clearly it's best if you 
can fill that in yourself. That happened with Howard. By the time of 
the 1996 election, he was seen as a safe pair of hands; someone who 
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likes Australia and likes his family. Over and above that people saw 
that he will try to do what he thinks is right. The other thing that 
needs to be emphasised is that Howard's image is a reflection of the 
man himself. It's an authentic image. One of the admirable 
characteristics of Australians is their irreverence. They see through 
people and actions that are not what they seem or set out to be. If it 
doesn't smell right, the Australian people won't buy it. (Interview 
with author, 2006) 
Howard's manner in public seems to reinforce his acceptance. He rarely 
uses written speech notes. Milne (interview with author, 2006) says a lot 
of ordinary people he has met "are absolutely gob-smacked at his 
[Howard's] ability to speak without notes. I think he understands that. 
These people say 'this bloke really knows his stuff, he hasn't got a line 
[written down]'." 
An ability to project the qualities of an ordinary man in himself is another 
hallmark of the Howard style. Bongiorno (interview with author, 2006) 
says the PM normally speaks with a flat tone - because of a hearing 
impairment- and uses language rather sparingly. He points to an image of 
being a careful and, in the context of the economy, parsimonious manager 
"reinforced by what he looks like and what he sounds like" (interview with 
author, 2006). Steketee (2006) says that these days "Howard assiduously 
peddles his ordinariness". Bongiorno further states: 
Once in office, one of the things that was never on view when he was 
unelectable of course is that the man is an astute student of politics. 
He's cunning; he can prosecute an argument in a way that doesn't 
alienate people. He has very little dramatic or rhetorical flair 
(interview with author, 2006). 
Crosby (2006), applying the intimate knowledge he acquired of Howard 
while federal director of the Liberal Party of Australia, explains: 
Howard is certainly no glamour puss. He eschews the notion of 
celebrity and you rarely see him on the social pages or surrounded 
by luvvies. Yet when you observe the way the public respond (sic) to 
him in the street, or in the community meetings he regularly attends 
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in city halls, public parks or school gymnasiums around the nation, 
you see his capacity to connect with people. 
Why has John Howard been able to cultivate a plain but respected persona 
with the electorate? One clue emerges from his clever study of politics, 
referred to by Bongiorno when he says Howard admits he has learned 
something from all of his predecessors: 
He studied them closely with a living memory, probably going back 
as far as Billy McMahon (because he worked on the McMahon 
campaign). People said: 'What have you learnt?'. And he replied: 
'That's for you to find out.' He said 'I've learned what to do and what 
not to do'. (Interview with author, 2006) 
Walter (2004, p. 18) credits Brett with showing "how Howard, scorning the 
intelligentsia, determinedly committed to plain speaking, has fashioned an 
enormously powerful message that professes to speak for the 'ordinary 
battler"'. Walter also identifies a way in which changes in the operation of 
the political system in Australia also assist the PM. He detects a rise in 
prime ministerial power aligned to a decline in party loyalty and 
participation, suggesting "weaker voter attachments enhance the role of the 
leader" (2004, p. 15), resulting in a diminished concentration on policy and 
more on the personality of the leader. 
Roskam (2oo6) concurs: 
To most voters, personality is more important than policy or politics. 
Voters aren't stupid. There's a reason they think this way. Politics 
and the events that determine politics are unpredictable - and 
voters know this. (p.82) 
Kelly (2006) finds that the national government today possesses "an 
overall apparatus . . . [which is] enormously important". It includes 
activities such as polling, determining the message(s), signals from the 
Prime Minister and the role of the PM in "setting the ground rules for the 
political debate". This apparatus provides abundant scope for shaping and 
projecting an image for the head of government, especially when he 
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chooses, like Howard does, to be 'out there' all the time speaking to and 
being seen with representatives of 'voter land'. In reflecting on a typically 
hectic week of whistlestop visits by the Prime Minister, Tingle (2006) 
recalled that "someone once dubbed Howard the Energiser bunny". 
The clinical explanation for this phenomenon is a ceaseless quest to control 
the media message. The cynical explanation is a remorseless quest to 
smother the media coverage. It seems to work around a formula which 
might be expressed simply as: 
News happens + PM injects himself into news = Howard is perceived to be in 
charge. 
One of Howard's predecessors, John Hewson, who has been increasingly a 
critic since departing from politics himself, summarises the way such a 
formula operates in these terms: 
Howard is probably the most skilful politician I have seen in decades 
in this country. He has a well-refined capacity to respond to 
circumstances and events as they unfold, and to turn them to his 
particular political advantage, irrespective of the real and 
substantive outcomes from a policy point of view. (Hewson, 2006) 
The notion of the ubiquitous news maker covers all media and all forms 
within those media. For instance, despite an oft-professed unwillingness or 
reluctance to 'provide a running commentary' on a story figuring 
significantly in the aforementioned 24-hour news cycle, the Prime Minister 
frequently engages in just such a commentary. Over the course of a typical 
day, he can do a radio interview with one of a band of favourite talk-back 
hosts or an ABC program, do an industry or electorate visit in front of TV 
and press cameras, make a major speech, conduct a press conference and 
do an evening 'doorstop' [brief statement to the media] if a big, late-
breaking story appears on the horizon such as an act of terrorism abroad or 
the death of a public figure at home. 
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A revealing example of how the Howard media strategy works is illustrated 
in figures 23 and 24 below. In April 2006 when the Prime Minister's turn 
arrived to appear as a witness before the Cole Commission of Inquiry into 
the AWB Ltd's wheat sales to Iraq, Howard's assertive arrival (figure 22) 
contrasted with the frenzied and clandestine arrivals on previous days of 
fellow Cabinet ministers Vaille (who scrambled through a crowd in the 
street) and Downer (who accessed an internal passageway from an 
adjoining office block) respectively. While Howard's testimony was open to 
all the working press inside the inquiry to repmt, the PM gave the media 
much more. 
Figw•e23 
Noth ing to fear: PM arrives at the Cole Commission of inquiry to give evidence 
(Source: http:/ fwww.smh.eom.au/ffximage/2006/04/I3/howard_wideweb_470X346,o.jpg) 
After his session in the witness box, he returned to his Sydney office and 
held a full-scale press conference (figure 24) in which he made 
observations about his own and others' evidence before Justice Cole. Not 
surprisingly, this approach gave the media many more pictures, sound 
bites and prime ministerial statements than they could have derived from 
the brief spell the PM had in the witness box. No doubt this was precisely 
the aim of Howard and his media advisers. 
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Figw•e24 
Telling it his way: PM gives his version of issues before Cole at a press conference. 
(Source: http:/ fwww.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-o4/2006-o4-I3-
voag.cfm?CFID=I7003122&CFfOKEN=gi0467S6) 
So in this case, the public glimpsed the PM's authoritative presence at the 
A WB commission but acquired huge 'slices' of prime ministerial 
justification, denial and explanation through the device of the subsequent 
pic facj news conference. This is an example of the Howard media strategy 
at its best - assert maximum control whenever possible. 
In the minds of the targets of this strategy - the Australian voting public -
the Howard image comprises characteristics of the chameleon in which the 
most enduring face is that of the conviction politician who deserves respect 
because he exudes decent Australian values and sentiments. Howard is 
seen as tirelessly interpreting and enacting the best Australian virtues and 
aspirations for the benefit of the many minds in which such qualities 
resonate. As a result, he is perceived by voters as strong and decisive (as 
figure 25 on the next page illustrates): 
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Newspoll Ratings of Leaders as Decisive and Strong 
Howard ALP opponent 
17-19 September 2004 78 69 
4-6 March 2005 81 69 
29-31 July 2005 78 58 
18-20 November 2005 80 59 
10-12 March 2006 83 49 
14-16 July 2006 80 57 
Figw•e25 
(Source: Newspoll, July 19, 2006) 
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CONCLUSION 
John Howard, for the first twenty years of his career in Parliament, 
acquired a profile as a dogged, earnest and largely colourless politician. His 
term as Federal Treasurer, which covered about a quarter of that period, 
would probably not have helped because that particular portfolio is one 
that traditionally consigns its occupants to a public profile as dour 
enforcers of fiscal constraint and heartless taxers. The tag of 'Honest 
Johnny' had gained some traction and his ordinariness was unavoidable, as 
Steketee notes: 
Perceptions are what count in politics. The image of Howard as 
ordinary was a handicap when he was Opposition leader. It cost him 
the job in 1989 because Liberal MPs thought Andrew Peacock 
looked more like a leader and was more likely to get them into office 
the following year. (Steketee, 2006). 
For better or for worse, Howard took his established persona into office as 
Prime Minister in 1996. As Morris (interview with author, 2006) suggests, 
people had a fair idea of the Howard image by the time this major 
milestone arrived. 
Within a few years, Howard discovered that incumbency and the vast 
machinery of government delivered a means by which he could earn a 
reputation based on a curious combination of his long-standing authority 
and a platform of incessant salesmanship. With the exception perhaps of a 
fiercely held ideology around industrial relations, Howard was and is still 
far from a model of political consistency. His term in the office of Prime 
Minister is littered with examples of back flips and contradictions. Indeed, 
as Tingle (2003) identifies, radical policy shifts represent Howard's 
"greatest sleight of hand with the Australian public." 
He and his advisers discovered that on a stage of their own construction 
with considerable theatricality and high-octane public relations, Howard 
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could convince the Australian electorate that he understood their best 
interests, knew best how to safeguard them and had a boundless capacity to 
share their joys, wows and fears. "Part of Howard's genius," says Oakes 
(Crikey.com, 2006) "is to look like a reasonable man even when he is 
engaged in the rankest political opportunism". Brett's interpretation 
(2005) is kinder, crediting Howard with speaking "straight from the heart 
of the nation and its mainstream". 
Thus a new and highly successful Howard image was built, in no small way 
through masterful media management. And while his words counted a 
great deal - when often his deeds did not - the most potent tools of his 
image have been the visual portrayal, the press and television pictures 
which tell the Howard story of steadfastness, strength, suppression of 
doubt and sympathy for the prevailing national mood - be it triumphant, 
terrified or tragic. 
Nothing better illustrates the public relations supremacy of, and irresistible 
journalistic acquiescence with, the Howard media strategy, which this 
research project has delineated and documented, than the circumstances 
and reporting of his 31 July 2006 decision to stay on in office to contest the 
2007 election. 
Always capable of invoking an element of surprise in the timing of his 
major announcements, the Prime Minister chose an ordinary Monday 
morning to reveal his intention to remain in office, following months of 
speculation and not a few stouches and stand-offs with his long-time 
deputy, Treasurer Peter Costello. 
But the Howard masterstroke was not merely the timing but the fact that 
he chose to do so on a day when he was far from the corridors of power in 
Canberra, far from most of the heavy hitters of the press gallery and far 
from the trappings of his office. He was visiting the small Queensland sugar 
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town of Silkwood. And so the day's main pic fac oozed all the tailor-made 
ingredients that Howard and his media machine cherish. 
fiNANCIAL REVIEW 
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• Costello's ambitions on hold • Cabinet reshuffle looms • Poll focus on IR 
Howard to fight fifth election 
Figure26 
P~J punt his 
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Still the One: The PM again earns the 'dream' headline and picture treatment in the 
national press coverage of the day he announced his intention to stay on in office. 
(Source: Australian Financial Review , 1 August 2 006; picture by Brian Cassey) 
As figure 26 (above) shows, the media treatment was impeccable. The 
semiotics work superbly: applauding school children, affinity with youth 
despite turning 67 a week earlier, a wave for the Silkwood locals, the bush 
hat, the open-neck shirt, the blue sky banishing the clouds and the first 
bold headline of his next political campaign. 
Pure politics, pure public relations, pure silk. The tacticians, the talent, the 
transmitters and the targets all perfectly aligned. 
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